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Human behavioral responses play an important role in the impact of disease outbreaks and yet they are often
overlooked in epidemiological models. Understanding to what extent behavioral changes determine the outcome
of spreading epidemics is essential to design effective intervention policies. Here we explore, analytically, the
interplay between the personal decision to protect oneself from infection and the spreading of an epidemic.
We do so by coupling a decision game based on the perceived risk of infection with a Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible model. Interestingly, we find that the simple decision on whether to protect oneself is enough to
modify the course of the epidemics, by generating sustained steady oscillations in the prevalence. We deem
these oscillations detrimental, and propose two intervention policies aimed at modifying behavioral patterns to
help alleviate them. Surprisingly, we find that pulsating campaigns, compared to continuous ones, are more
effective in diminishing such oscillations.
1. INTRODUCTION
In a context of a disease outbreak, it is known that humans
might change their behavioral patterns in an effort to avoid in-
fection [1]. Behavioral responses range from wearing face
masks or increasing hand hygiene to prevent influenza-like
illnesses, to using condoms to stop sexually transmitted dis-
eases, to avoid traveling to an infection locus, among others.
In the past years, substantial efforts have been made by gov-
ernments and policy makers to monitor the spreading of dis-
eases and implement effective containment measures, some
of which include recommending certain behavioral changes
to the population. Though crucial, the effect of changing hu-
man behavior is often overlooked in epidemiological models
for disease spreading that might ultimately be used for policy-
making. Studying the effect of individual human responses to
the presence of infectious diseases in a population is of out-
most importance as it is known to alter the spreading dynamics
and can cause a systematic bias in the disease forecast if not
taken into account [2, 3].
Reports of the existence of an effect of human behavior on
the spreading of epidemics have been known for long. How-
ever, it has not been until recently that some mathematical
models have explicitly incorporated the effect of individual
behavioral responses on the outcome of an epidemic [4, 5].
Some interesting mathematical models consider, for example,
individuals lowering their daily contact activity rates once an
epidemic has been identified in a community [6–8], individ-
uals rewiring their contacts with infected neighbors [9–12],
or the selfish behavior of individuals confronting vaccina-
tion campaigns and its effect on the endemicity of the epi-
demics [13–19].
A very common way of factoring in the effect of human be-
havior in epidemics is to consider that individuals alter their
behavior according to the prevalence level of the disease. In-
deed, empirical studies [20, 21] have shown that protective be-
havior increases as a disease becomes more prevalent. How-
ever, some surveys [22, 23] indicate that individuals base the
decision on whether to protect themselves in their perceived
risk of infection, which may differ from their real risk of in-
fection as other factors are taken into account. These factors
may include one’s perceived susceptibility, the number of re-
ported cases of diseased individuals, the distance to the focus
of the epidemic, the cost of the measures to be taken, etc.
In our model, we assume that individuals act according to
their perception of risk of infection, and more particularly,
that individuals will be inclined to take preventive measures
if their perceived risk exceeds the cost associated to taking the
prophylactic measure. We formulate the decision problem as
a two-strategy game theory dilemma, where the individual’s
perceived risk depends on the cost of contracting the disease
and its prevalence. One strategy is to take protective mea-
sures against the disease, in which case we say that the agent
is protected (P); the other strategy is to disregard any behav-
ioral change and stay not protected (NP). Taking the protec-
tive measures will imply, in terms of the epidemics, that this
individual will have a lower chance of getting infected if she
is susceptible, and that she will be less infectious to others in
case she is infected. We couple this decision game with an epi-
demic process, modeled using the Microscopic Markov Chain
Approach [24], for the SIS model —in which agents can ei-
ther be susceptible (S) or infected (I)— and we let both pro-
cesses evolve simultaneously. On the one hand, the decision
on whether to adopt protective measures is made according to
the risk perceived in each strategy according to global infor-
mation. On the other hand, the epidemics propagates in a con-
tact network, using then local information. We call this model
“risk–driven epidemic spreading” given that the epidemics is
palliated by the individual prophylaxis which in turn is driven
by their risk perception.
We will present our analysis for surrogates of contact di-
rect networks. First, we investigate mathematically the non-
linear interplay between the risk-perception decision and the
prevalence of the disease, whose outcome is a sustained oscil-
lation in time. We scrutinize the role of the different param-
eters of the model with particular focus on the effectiveness
of the protection method, that plays a key role in the oscilla-
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2tions. Furthermore, we provide the exact epidemic thresholds
and protection thresholds. Finally, we evaluate two types of
awareness campaigns leveraging the full predictive power of
the model: a continuous awareness campaign that is active
through time, and a pulsating campaign that is activated only
when the epidemics is on the rise. The results prove that pul-
sating campaigns are more effective to contain the prevalence
of the disease.
2. RISK PERCEPTION-DRIVEN EPIDEMIC SPREADING
MODEL
In our risk–driven epidemic spreading model, agents can
be in four possible states: Infected and protected, infected and
not protected, susceptible and protected, or susceptible and
not protected. Formally speaking, let us define the macro-
scopic quantities Ip(t), Inp(t), Sp(t), and Snp(t) as the frac-
tion of the population in each of the former possible states at
time t, respectively.
The agents will choose one of the two possible strategies
according to the difference of payoffs of each strategy. The
payoff of being protected (Pp) and the payoff of disregarding
protection (Pnp) are:
Pp(t) = −c− T Ip(t)
Ip(t) + Sp(t)
(1)
Pnp(t) = −T Inp(t)
Inp(t) + Snp(t)
. (2)
The parameter c refers to the cost associated to taking the pro-
tective measures. This cost may refer to the monetary cost that
the individual has to assume for adopting the protection, but
also to other related costs, like the side effects provoked by the
protection, or other personal concerns regarding the measures
to be taken. The parameter T accounts for the cost of contract-
ing an infection, that is, how severe are the consequences of
an infection. The quantities Ip(t)Ip(t)+Sp(t) and
Inp(t)
Inp(t)+Snp(t)
are
the fraction of infected individuals that have chosen strategy
P or NP, respectively. These ratios can be interpreted as the
success of one strategy over the other, and players in P and
NP use this information to assess how well their strategy is
paying off. Therefore, the severity (or cost) of the infection
T multiplied by the estimated fraction of protected or not pro-
tected individuals that get infected, encapsulates the perceived
risk of infection.
The transition probabilities between strategies are defined
as a function of the difference in payoffs ∆Pnp-p(t) = Pnp(t)−
Pp(t) and ∆Pp-np(t) = Pp(t) − Pnp(t), respectively. In this
sense, agents will transition to the strategy which is providing
a greater payoff at the current time with a given probability.
These transition probabilities are those leading to the replica-
tor dynamics at the population level [25], i.e.:
Γp→np(t) =
∆Pnp-p(t)
T + c
Θ(∆Pnp-p(t)) (3)
Γnp→p(t) =
∆Pp-np(t)
T + c
Θ(∆Pp-np(t)), (4)
with Θ representing the Heaviside function, where Θ(x) = 1
if x ≥ 0 and Θ(x) = 0 if x < 0, and (T + c) being the nor-
malizing factor that is equal to the maximum possible payoff
difference between P and NP strategists.
In general, behavioral changes towards protection do not
imply an absolute protection from the disease (e.g. the effi-
cacy of condoms for the transmission of HIV is approximately
80% [26]). For this reason, we define a parameter γ as the
probability of the preventive measures failing, where γ = 1
means that the prevention strategy is useless and both pro-
tected and unprotected users will get infected with the same
probability. On the other hand, if γ = 0, a susceptible pro-
tected agent will be totally immune against getting infected,
and an infected protected agent will absolutely not transmit
the disease to anyone else. The protection mechanism is bi-
lateral, meaning that as long as one of the two parties partic-
ipating in an infection contact is protected, the other party is
protected as well.
The transition probabilities for changing the epidemic com-
partment can be summarized as the following reactions be-
tween agents i and j:
Sinp + I
j
np
λ−→ Iinp + Ijnp (5)
Sinp + I
j
p
γλ−−→ Iinp + Ijp (6)
Sip + I
j
np
γλ−−→ Iip + Ijnp (7)
Sip + I
j
p
γλ−−→ Iip + Ijp , (8)
where λ is the infectivity rate of the epidemic and γ is the
aforementioned probability that preventive measures fail. The
variables Sip, I
i
p, S
i
np, I
i
np with i = 1, 2, . . . , N describe the
state of the N agents in the population. Note that the lin-
ear reduction, instead of quadratic, of the γ parameter as two
agents with the same P strategy meet (see Eq. (8)). The fact
that the reduction of the infectivity rate λ is linear in γ implies
that there is no additional benefit in both partners being pro-
tected. This is true for certain protection mechanisms, while
for others a quadratic reduction would be in order.
Now, by using all of the above definitions, we can write
the dynamical equations of the coupled the risk-driven epi-
demic model using a probabilistic approach, the Microscopic
Markov Chain Approach [27]:
3Sip(t+ 1) = (1− Γp→np(t))
[
Sip(t)(1− qip(t)) + Iip(t)µ
]
+ Γnp→p(t)
[
Sinp(t)(1− qip(t)) + Iinp(t)µ
]
(9)
Sinp(t+ 1) = Γp→np(t)
[
Sip(t)(1− qinp(t)) + Iip(t)µ
]
+ (1− Γnp→p(t))
[
Sinp(t)(1− qinp(t)) + Iinp(t)µ
]
(10)
Iip(t+ 1) = (1− Γp→np(t))
[
Sip(t)q
i
p(t) + I
i
p(t)(1− µ)
]
+ Γnp→p(t)
[
Sinp(t)q
i
p(t) + I
i
np(t)(1− µ)
]
(11)
Iinp(t+ 1) = Γp→np(t)
[
Sip(t)q
i
np(t) + I
i
p(t)(1− µ)
]
+ (1− Γnp→p(t))
[
Sinp(t)q
i
np(t) + I
i
np(t)(1− µ)
]
(12)
where µ is the epidemic recovery rate. The terms in brack-
ets in the equations refer to the epidemic spreading dynamics,
which describe the transit between the compartments S 
 I .
The other terms refer to the game dynamics, allowing the tran-
sition between the compartments P 
 NP . The quantities
qip(t) and q
i
np(t) express the probability that agent i will get
infected at time t if she is protected or not protected, respec-
tively, and read:
qip(t) = 1−
N∏
j=1
[
1−Aijλγ(Ijp (t) + Ijnp(t))
]
(13)
qinp(t) = 1−
N∏
j=1
[
1−Aijλ(γIjp (t) + Ijnp(t))
]
, (14)
where Aij refers to the adjacency matrix of the epidemic pro-
cess, with Aij = 1 if agents i and j are connected, and
Aij = 0 otherwise. We are implicitly assuming a markovian
dynamics, i.e. that temporal correlations are absent on active
edges [28].
3. OSCILLATORY BEHAVIOR
Solving numerically the equations of the risk–driven epi-
demic model (Eqs. (9)-(12)) on top of network models (see
Appendix A), we observe that the infection prevalence, I , as
well as the number of protected individuals, P , oscillates in
time in a sustained way, see Fig. 1(a). To unveil the mech-
anism behind the oscillations, we plot in Fig. 1(b) the frac-
tion of agents in each one of the compartments, in time. If
we focus on the gray area, we see that when Pnp is higher
than Pp, individuals cease to protect themselves, and this im-
plies that the number of infected individuals start to increase.
When this happens, the payoff of the strategy protected (Pp)
becomes larger than Pnp, provoking individuals to start pro-
tecting themselves, and thus the number of infected individu-
als is again reduced, sustaining the limit cycle observed in the
evolution of I and P .
An interesting question is whether oscillations disappear or
are reduced for certain values of the parameters. We explored
how the cost of contracting the disease T affects the afore-
mentioned oscillations, and observed that higher values of T
(higher cost) generate smaller oscillations (see Fig. 1(a) left
plot), given that when the cost of contracting an infection is
really high, almost all individuals adopt the protected strategy.
However, when plotting the relative amplitude of the oscilla-
tions (see Fig. 1(a)(right)) we observe that for all values of T
the relative amplitude has the same order of magnitude. The
absolute value of the oscillations is lowered due to a lower
presence of infectious cases, but relatively the oscillations are
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FIG. 1. Numerical results of the risk–driven epidemic spreading model on a
power-law network of size N = 2000 and exponent 2.5. Default parameters
are c = 1, µ = 0.1, T = 10, λ = 0.05, and γ = 0.1. (a) Fraction
of Protected (P = Sp + Ip) and Infected (I = Ip + Inp) individuals as a
function of time. We observe an oscillatory behavior that is sustained in time.
(b) Detail of the oscillations. The red and blue lines indicate the fraction of
Infected and Protected individuals, respectively. The black dashed line plots
the payoff of the strategy not protected (Pnp) while the solid black line is the
payoff of the protected strategy (Pp).
the same. We conclude that the cost of contracting the disease
T does not induce the oscillations to vanish.
One would think that the probability that preventive mea-
sures fail (γ) and the infectivity rate (λ) are able to shape the
oscillations as well. We explore this in Fig. 2(b), and find
that oscillations are only present for low values of γ and low
values of λ, pointing out that only when the preventive mea-
sure is very effective and the disease is not very contagious
is when individuals face the dilemma on whether to protect
themselves that ultimately leads to the aforementioned oscil-
latory behavior. Outside this area of the parameters, either the
disease is very contagious, or the measures are useless, or a
combination of both. In any case, the number of infected in-
dividuals grows larger and we do not observe oscillations. We
also see that as the infection cost T increases, the region of
parameters that presents oscillations becomes smaller, but the
relative oscillations are higher.
Note that oscillations can only emerge when the time scale
for the decision on prophylaxis is equal or faster than the typ-
ical time scale of the disease. Otherwise, the epidemics will
reach equilibrium too soon for any strategic decision to have
impact on the infection. On the other hand, when agents eval-
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FIG. 2. Numerical results of the risk–driven epidemic spreading model on a
power-law network of size N = 2000 and exponent 2.5. Default parameters
are c = 1, µ = 0.1, T = 10, λ = 0.05, and γ = 0.1. (a) Amplitudes of the
oscillations in the fraction of infected individuals as a function of time. Left
plot depicts the absolute value of the amplitude, while the right one depicts
the relative one, all of them for three values of T , the cost of infection. Higher
values of T (higher cost) generate smaller oscillations (see left plot). On the
right, we can see that all amplitude of oscillations are of the same order of
magnitude, when calculated relatively to the fraction of infected individuals.
(b) Average relative amplitudes of the fraction of infected individuals in the
steady state, for all range of γ (the probability of protection failure) and λ (the
infectivity rate), for different values of T . We observe that as the infection
cost increases, the area where the oscillations are present is reduced, but the
oscillations themselves are larger.
uate their payoffs before the disease has reached its equilib-
rium, the success of each strategy (used in Eqs. (1) and (2) to
update the prophylactic behavior) does not capture the actual
risk of getting infected. In other words, agents take their de-
cisions based on information that is delayed in time. This is
precisely the most common scenario for many epidemic out-
breaks.
Once explored the nature of the oscillatory dynamics, we
now characterize to what extent the quality of the protective
measures affects the spreading of the disease. In Fig. 3 we
plot the steady state fraction of both I and P individuals as a
function of the epidemic infectivity λ, for different protection
effectivity values γ. When γ = 1, the prevention measures are
useless and thus we recover the second order phase transition
typical of an SIS model. For very effective measures (γ ≈ 0),
a majority of the population adopts the protective behavior
and thus the number of infected individuals is almost zero for
all values of λ. For intermediate values of the protection ef-
fectivity (γ = 0.5) the effect is interesting: for values of the
infectivity sufficiently low (but above the critical threshold), a
fraction of individuals adopt protection, but as the infectivity
increases, for this particular value of the effectivity γ, prophy-
laxis is not enough to prevent infection and thus agents cease
to protect themselves. Looking at the top plot, we see that the
adoption of protection in this region of λ leads to a decrease
in the number of infections, but the range of λ where this hap-
pens is small. In conclusion, the addition of prophylaxis is
only able to diminish (not completely eliminate) the number
of infectious cases and that only happens for a narrow range
of λ. Actually, the epidemic is only fully eradicated when
the disease infectivity λ is below its critical value λc, and this
critical value does not seem to depend on the decision game.
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FIG. 3. Numerical results of the proposed model on a power-law network of
size N = 2000 and exponent 2.5. Default parameters are c = 1, µ = 0.1,
and T = 10. Fraction of infected individuals (I = Inp + Ip) and fraction
of protected individuals (P = Sp + Ip) in the steady state as a function of
the epidemic infectivity probability λ, for different values of the probability
of preventive measures failing (γ).
4. EPIDEMIC THRESHOLD
To see if the latter statement is true, we need to calculate the
critical threshold of this coupled system, and discern which
are the parameters that influence it. We start off by consider-
ing our system in equilibrium, i.e. the game does not evolve
and the epidemics is stationary. The equilibrium of the deci-
sion game is reached when agents keep the same strategy over
time. For an agent to keep the same strategy over a period
of time, it must happen that no other strategy provides a bet-
ter payoff than the one provided by the current strategy. In
our case, this only happens when the transition probabilities
between strategies fulfil Γnp→p = Γp→np = 0, which in turn
requires that both payoffs are equal, i.e. Pp = Pnp (see its
derivation in Appendix B). Using Eqs. (1)-(2) we have:
c
T
=
Inp
Inp + Snp
− Ip
Ip + Sp
. (15)
However, imposing the previous condition for the equilibrium
of the game at the critical point of the epidemics λc, and not-
ing that at λc the fraction of Ip, Inp ≈ 0, we observe that this
condition can only be satisfied for c = 0. In other words,
the equilibrium of the system at the critical point can only be
achieved when the cost of the protection is zero, which gives
no incentives to individuals to choose the protected strategy
over the non–protected one, according to Eqs. (1)-(2).
In conclusion, at the critical point of the epidemics the game
plays no role, and thus the epidemic threshold is the usual of
5the SIS model [27]:
λc = µ/Λmax(A), (16)
where Λmax(A) refers to the maximum eigenvalue of the adja-
cency matrix A. Indeed, this result confirms our intuition that
the decision game is not able to shift the tipping point of the
epidemics.
5. PROTECTION THRESHOLD
In analogy to the epidemic threshold, we can define the
threshold λ˜, such that agents start protecting themselves. The
protection threshold λ˜, can be calculated in a well-mixed pop-
ulation assuming that the fraction of protected agents is negli-
gible in comparison to the fraction of non-protected ones. In
the well mixed population, agents interact randomly. Accord-
ingly, the interactions are not structured and thus the proba-
bility for an agent to be in a given compartment is the same in
the whole population. Therefore, the system can be described
by only four variables: Sp, Snp, Ip, Inp. Accordingly, the re-
currence relations take the same form as in Eqs. (9)-(12) but
without the label i. In a similar way, the infection probabilities
qp and qnp are given by:
qnp(t) = λ(γIp(t) + Inp(t))
qp(t) = λγ(Ip(t) + Inp(t)). (17)
For calculating this threshold in a well–mixed population, λ˜,
we can make use of the equilibrium condition (that trans-
lates in a stationary state for the epidemics). We recall that
the protection threshold will satisfy: Sp, Ip  Snp, Inp and
Sp, Ip  1. Therefore, we can expand the equilibrium condi-
tion for the game in Eq. (15) as:
c
T
(Ip + Sp) =
Inp
(Ip + Sp)
1− Ip − Sp − Ip
= Inp(Ip + Sp)− Ip +O((Ip + Sp)2). (18)
Since we want to calculate the threshold for the strategy p,
we will neglect all the second order and higher order terms in
(Ip + Sp). Consequently, Eq. (18) can be rewritten as:
Ip = (Ip + Sp)
(
Inp − c
T
)
, (19)
and the stationary Eqs. (9)-(12), in the well-mixed approxima-
tion, read:
Sp =
Ip
Inp
µ
γλ
(20)
Ip = Inp
1− Inp − µλ
Inp(1 + γ)− γ + µγλ
. (21)
Inserting Eq. (20) into Eq. (19) leads to a quadratic equation
for Inp:
I2np − Inp
(
1 +
c
T
− µ
γλ
)
− c
T
µ
γλ
= 0 . (22)
In the quadratic equation, there is only one non negative solu-
tion given by:
Inp =
1
2
1− µγλ + cT +
√√√√√√
(
µ
γλ
+
c
T
)2
+ 4
µ
γλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
 . (23)
The threshold, λ˜, is reached as Ip becomes non zero. The
denominator in the expression of Ip in Eq. (20) is always pos-
itive:
Inp(1 + γ)− γ + µ
γλ
=
1
2
[
1− γ + µ
λ
(
1
γ
− 1
)
+ (1 + γ)
( c
T
+
√
∆
)]
> 0 .
(24)
The positivity is guaranteed due to γ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the de-
nominator is always positive, the threshold is then reached
when the numerator becomes zero. The threshold condition
therefore reads:
1− Inp − µ/λ˜ = 0. (25)
Inserting the expression of Inp in Eq. (25), we find, after some
algebra, the threshold λ˜:
λ˜± =
2µ
1− cT ∓
√(
1− cT
)2 − 4 cT γ1−γ . (26)
The equation for the threshold has two solutions: λ˜− and λ˜+.
The threshold λ˜− describes the critical infectivity rate above
which agents start protecting themselves. In other words, be-
low λ˜− there is still no risk of infection sufficiently high as
to consider taking preventive measures. On the other hand,
the threshold λ˜+ is the point where agents stop adopting the
protective behavior, since the protection is not sufficient to
combat the high infection risk. From Eq. (26) we obtain
limγ→0 λ˜+ =∞. This means that, under the condition where
protection leads to complete immunization (γ = 0), an in-
creasing infectivity rate does not stop agents from taking pre-
ventive measures against the disease and the disease is con-
trolled independently of the infection probability.
In Fig. 4(a)(left) and Fig. 4(a)(right), we present the full
phase space (λ−γ) for the expected fraction of protected indi-
viduals, and infected individuals, respectively. We see clearly
that agents only take a protective behavior when the infec-
tivity rate is low and the preventive measures are reasonably
efficient. The real parts of both solutions λ˜− and λ˜+ are dis-
played in Fig. 4(a)(left) as a single blue curve over the phase
space of the prevalence of the protected.
To further understand the adoption of prophylactic behav-
ior, in Fig. 4(b) we show the partition of the population across
the four compartments (Snp, Sp, Ip and Inp) as a function of λ
and γ. From the analysis of the four compartments we observe
four different regimes:
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FIG. 4. Numerical results of the proposed model on a power-law network of
size N = 2000 and exponent 2.5. Default parameters are c = 1, µ = 0.1,
and T = 10. (a) Phase-space diagrams of the prevalence on the number of
Protected (left) and number of Infected individuals (right). Red line in left
plot denotes the epidemic threshold of our model, as calculated by (16). The
blue line on the left plot is the protection threshold as obtained in (26). The
green line indicates the epidemic threshold in the case of a fully protected
population. (b) Phase-space diagrams for each one of the four compartments
of our model, at the steady state, for all range of λ and γ.
I. Below the epidemic threshold λc = 0.01 (red line), the
disease dies out and thus all agents are in the Snp com-
partment.
II. For low values of γ (meaning high protection effec-
tivity), the majority of agents adopt the protection and
avoid the infection, this is observed at the darkest area
of the Sp compartment (below the green line that corre-
sponds to a fully protected population).
III. For values of γ in the protection range defined by the
thresholds Eq. (26) (area delimited by the blue line)
most agents protect themselves but still get infected.
IV. Beyond the protective threshold (area beyond the blue
line), the protection measures are highly ineffective,
which causes agents to disregard any protection and
thus the infection prevalence is the one expected for
such values of λ in absence of the decision game.
6. INTERVENTION POLICIES
Once we understand the key role that risk perception has
on the adoption of protective measures and, in turn, on the
infection prevalence, we now focus on possible intervention
strategies. Such strategies are often designed to change the
individual’s risk perception, as this is known to induce a be-
havioral change [29, 30]. One way to change the risk percep-
tion is to spread information about the severity of the disease
in the hopes of raising awareness and containing the epidemic
spreading. This can be done either locally, by considering
first-hand information and word-of-mouth spreading [31–34],
or globally, i.e. using mass-media outlets to disseminate such
information [35]. Our proposal is to raise awareness glob-
ally, by increasing the perception of risk of the population. In
our model, the risk perception is encapsulated by the cost of
the infection T multiplied by the estimated fraction of pro-
tected or not protected individuals that get infected, respec-
tively. Our strategy relies on increasing the cost of infection
T by some quantity ∆T , which can be interpreted as tricking
the population into believing that the consequences of an in-
fection are more severe than they actually are. Based on the
previous mechanism, we propose two types of campaigns: (i)
awareness campaigns continuously enforced in time, and (ii)
pulsating awareness campaigns only activated when the infec-
tion prevalence is increasing.
In the first one, the campaign raises the perception risk con-
tinuously by a certain increment ∆T . Given that this ∆T is
sustained in time, this simply leads to an increased infection
risk (T + ∆T ) in Eqs. (1)-(2). In the second one, the in-
crement ∆T is applied only when the infection prevalence
is growing with time, i.e. (T + ∆TΘ[I(t) − I(t − 1)]),
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside function. Additionally, for the
pulsed intervention we normalize the transition probabilities
in Eqs. (3)-(4) according to the infection cost at time t, i.e.
with T + c+ ∆TΘ[I(t)− I(t− 1)].
Both campaigns increase the population’s perception on
how serious it is to contract an infection, the only difference
being whether this intervention is enforced temporarily (in the
case of pulsating) or permanently (in the continuous case).
What we observe is that this strategy turns out to be more
effective in alleviating the oscillations when it is enforced in
a pulsating manner than when it is promoted continuously,
see Fig. 5. This result seems counterintuitive at first, as one
would think that a constant and permanent shift in the infec-
tivity cost would be more effective than a shift that is only
applied on and off. To illustrate the mechanism why a pulsat-
ing campaign proves more effective than a continuous one, we
plot, in Fig. 6, the fraction of infected individuals I, the pro-
tection level P, and the normalized payoff difference between
the protected and non-protected strategies, as they evolve in
time, starting from t = 0. On top, for the sake of clarity, we
illustrate the periods of time in which each of the campaigns
is active.
Following the enumerated points depicted in Fig. 6, we
are able to describe the effective differences between the two
strategies. Starting out from an initial fraction of infected in-
dividuals, the infection starts to grow. In this stage, both in-
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FIG. 5. Time evolution of the infection prevalence in the presence of
a pulsating awareness campaign (top) and a continuously sustained
awareness campaign (bottom), for different values of the perceived
risk increment ∆T . The contact network used here is a power-law
network of size N = 2000 and exponent 2.5.
terventions are active and operate with the same infection cost
T + ∆T , therefore rendering identical curves. However, as
the infection grows, individuals start protecting themselves,
which slows down the spreading of the infection. Eventually,
the protection is adopted by enough individuals such as to pre-
vent the infection from increasing any more. This maximum
of the infection is depicted in label 1. Given that the epidemics
is not increasing anymore, the pulsed strategy is switched off,
which causes the difference in payoffs to drop for the pulsed
strategy (see label 2). This means that, at this point, indi-
viduals subject to the continuous intervention have a greater
incentive to adopt protection than those under the pulsating
campaign. The normalized payoff difference for both cam-
paigns evolve further, up to a point in which the payoff for the
protected strategy and the payoff for the non-protected strat-
egy are equal (the payoff difference is zero, see label 3). This
point defines the maximum of the protection curve (see label
4), because from that moment on, individuals will have a neg-
ative payoff difference, meaning they will consider a better
strategy to disregard protection. This, in turn, promotes the
propagation of the epidemics, and therefore the I curve starts
to grow again (see label 5). At this moment, the pulsating
strategy is switched on again, causing the pulsating interven-
tion’s payoff difference to increase abruptly, effectively reach-
ing a lower minimum than the one of the continuous strategy
(see label 6). At this point, users subject to the pulsating in-
tervention have both a higher number of infectives than in the
continuous case, and a higher payoff difference; which im-
plies that the individuals under the pulsating campaign will
perceive a higher risk and protect themselves more than un-
der the continuous intervention. This can be seen in label 7,
where individuals in the pulsating campaign are not disregard-
ing protection as much as continuous intervention users. Con-
sequently, the infection prevalence in the case of a pulsating
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FIG. 6. Infection prevalence (top), protection level (middle) and
normalized payoff difference (bottom), as a function of time for
∆T = 1.2. For the pulsed intervention, we define T (t) = T +
∆TΘ[I(t)− I(t− 1)]. In the case of a continuous intervention, we
have T (t) = T+∆T . The contact network used here is a power-law
network of sizeN = 2000 and exponent 2.5. Default parameters are
c = 1, µ = 0.1, and T = 10. The pulsating campaign allows to
more efficiently suppress the peaks in the infection prevalence than
the sustained campaign.
campaign will grow less than the one subject to continuous
intervention, as seen in label 8. From that moment on, the
mechanism illustrated in labels 1 to 8 is repeated periodically.
Put in a nutshell, both continuous and pulsating campaigns
seek to raise the awareness of the population by increasing
the perceived infection cost. The reason why the pulsating
campaign is more effective is because the minima and maxima
of the function of the difference in payoffs are moderated by
switching on and off the intervention campaign. When the
maximum difference in payoffs is relaxed by switching off the
intervention (as seen in label 2), it causes less people to adopt
protection (label 4), which results in a slightly higher infection
than in the continuous case (label 5). Symmetrically, when
the minimum in payoff difference is increased by switching
on the intervention (label 6), less people disregard protection
(label 7) and a lower infection prevalence is achieved (label
8). By making the minima and maxima less pronounced, the
oscillations are more dampened in the pulsating intervention.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Wrapping up, we have confronted the quantitative analysis
of prophylactic human behavior in the spread of direct con-
tact transmittable diseases using a mathematical model. The
results allow us to better understand some observed oscilla-
tory patterns that could depend on the biological seasonality
of viruses and bacteria, and according to our findings, also on
8the human decision of prophylaxis.
Our model is the first description, up to date, of the co-
evolutionary dynamics of human behavior and disease spread-
ing, using a probabilistic microscopic model for the epidemic
spreading coupled to a risk-driven decision game. The ac-
curacy of the epidemic spreading description at the level of
individuals in a network, using our model, allows to include a
decision strategy in a very natural way for each individual.
The results of the model are enlightening. First we prove
the emergence of self-sustained oscillations in the prevalence
of the disease as a consequence of the interplay between the
prevalence and the assessment of risk by individuals. This
discovery allows to think about mechanisms to ameliorate the
evaluation of risk made by individuals, with the aim of damp-
ing out these oscillations that represent a health threat and a
possible collapse of health services.
We do fix our attention on the quantitative evaluation of
awareness campaigns as probably the best strategies to mod-
ify risk perception. We analyzed two different types of cam-
paigns: continuous (persistent in time), and pulsating (active
only in certain periods of time). Through the mathematical
model we discover that pulsating campaigns are far more effi-
cient that continuous ones in damping out the oscillatory be-
havior of the disease. The explanation of this interesting find-
ing is rooted on the interplay between the risk assessment and
the real prevalence: the pulsating campaign triggers aware-
ness only when the prevalence is rising and not when it is
descending. This provokes a delay on the prophylaxis action
for those individuals who assess the risk based on the current
prevalence and not on the awareness, and this small mismatch
makes the awareness action more effective when it appears
again.
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APPENDIX
A. Network model
To illustrate the model, we will consider the case of sex-
ually transmitted diseases, without considering the medical
details of any particular disease, only the direct propagation
mechanism and the associated risk perception. The propa-
gation of sexually transmitted diseases takes place on the so-
called sexual contact networks [36–38]. In these networks, the
distribution of the number of sexual partners is heterogeneous,
with few individuals having a number of sexual contacts or-
ders of magnitude larger than the average. Previous studies
approximated the distribution of the number of sexual con-
tacts, P (k), with a power law P (k) ∼ k−γ , being k the num-
ber of sexual contacts. These studies [38, 39] identified scal-
ing exponents between 1.5 < γ < 3.5. More specifically, they
state that sexual contact networks have different scaling expo-
nents depending on whether they depict relationships between
men, men and women, or among women. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we will focus on men–men sexual contact networks,
although the same analysis can be performed on heterosex-
ual networks. We will study the coupled disease-decision dy-
namics on synthetic networks that are built to resemble the
structure of real men–men sexual contact networks. There
are a series of other models, besides the power law, that have
been found to fit well the degree distribution of sexual contact
networks [40, 41]. However, our results are not only robust
for power laws with different exponents, but are also quali-
tatively equivalent for a well mixed population. Accordingly,
we would not observe a different phenomenology by consider-
ing other generative network models yielding different degree
distributions.
B. Conditions for equilibrium
For characterizing the equilibrium of Eqs. (9)-(12), we first
focus on the condition such that the system can reach the equi-
librium state. Can the system reach the equilibrium state if
the the transition probabilities are non zero, Γa→b 6= 0? In-
tuitively, since the game and disease dynamics are decoupled,
it should not be possible. For proofing so, let us consider the
following new set of variables:
P i ≡ Iip + Sip (27)
NP i ≡ Iinp + Sinp (28)
Iip ≡ Iip (29)
Iinp ≡ Iinp, (30)
where the variables P and NP represent the probability of
an agent adopting the protection mechanism, respectively not
adopting the protection mechanism. With these variables the
recurrence relations become:
9∆P i=Pi(t+ 1)−Pi(t) = NP iΓnp→p − P iΓp→np (31)
∆NP i=NP i(t+ 1)−NP i(t) = −NP iΓnp→p + P iΓp→np (32)
∆Iip=I
i
p(t+ 1)−Iip(t) = −µIip + (P i − Iip)λγ(Iip + Iinp)− Γnp→pIinp + Γp→npIip (33)
∆Iinp=I
i
np(t+ 1)−Iinp(t)=−µIinp+(NV i − Iinp)λ(γIip + Iinp) + Γp→npIip − Γnp→pIinp. (34)
Since the transition probabilities Γnp→p and Γp→np contain
a Heavyside function Θ(Pp − Pnp) and Θ(Pnp − Pp), re-
spectively (see Eqs. (3) and (4)), they cannot be non zero
simultaneously. Consequently, the two terms in the first two
equations (31) and (32) cannot compensate each other such
that ∆P i = ∆NP i = 0. Therefore, equilibrium can only be
reached if Γnp→p = Γp→np = 0, i.e. Pp = Pnp (see Eq. (15)).
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